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Comments and Casenotes
THE HOPE NATURAL GAS CASE AND ITS IMPACT
ON STATE UTILITY REGULATION
In the recent case of Federal Power Commission et al. v.
Hope Natural Gas Co.,' the Federal Power Commission,
acting under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, after a full hear-
ing upon complaint of several wholesale customers, ordered
the Hope Natural Gas Company to cut its rates for natural
gas sold in interstate commerce so as to reduce its operat-
ing revenues by $3,609,857, or about 20o (or more than
60% of its net income). In doing this, the Commission
figured that the Company would still have a return of
6 % or better on a rate base of $33,712,526, the "'actual
legitimate cost' of the Company's interstate property less
depletion and depreciation and plus unoperated acreage,
working capital and future net capital additions." The
Company had submitted evidence from which it estimated
reproduction cost at $97,000,000 and a so-called "original
cost" which exceeded $105,000,000 (based on 1938 material
and labor prices). Allowing for an accrued depreciation
of about 35% of reproduction cost, the Company claimed
a rate base of $66,000,000 and asked for an 8% rate of
return. The Company's estimate of original cost (actual?)
was about $69,735,000. The Commission estimate was
based on this but excluded (before deducting depreciation)
an item of $17,000,000, made up largely of expenditures
which had been charged to operating expenses prior to
1938 ($12,000,000 for well digging prior to 1923 and various
other expenditures which for one reason or another had
been charged to operating expenses as they occurred).
In a petition for review of the above Commission's
order, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals set the order
aside for the reasons : 2
1. "that the rate base should reflect the 'present fair
value' of the property, that the Commission in determining
the 'value' should have considered reproduction cost and
trended original cost, and that 'actual legitimate cost'
(prudent investment) was not the proper measure of 'fair
2 64 S. Ct. 281 (U. S., 1944). A companion case, decided in the same
opinion, was City of Cleveland v. Hope Natural Gas Co.
2 134 F. (2d) 287 (C. C. A. 4th, 1943).
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value' where price levels had changed since the invest-
ment;"
2. "that the well-drilling costs and overhead items in
the amount of some $17,000,000 should have been included
in the rate-base;" and
3. "that accrued depletion and depreciation and the
annual allowance for that expense should be computed on
the basis of 'present fair value' of the property not on the
basis of 'actual legitimate cost.'"
The Supreme Court granted petitions of certiorari to
the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals because of the
public importance of the questions presented,3 and, after
hearing, reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals. Justices
Reed, Frankfurter and Jackson wrote separate dissenting
opinions, and Justices Black and Murphy wrote brief con-
curring opinions taking special issue with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissent. Mr. Justice Roberts took no part
in the decision of the case.
The majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas,
after an extended delineation of the facts, is a rather brief
justification of the result. It could be boiled down to a
conclusion of administrative law, namely, that the Court
would not substitute its judgment for that of the Commis-
sion as to the reasonableness of rates, the determination
of which was left by Congress to the Commission under
no formula other than that of "just and reasonable". Un-
less the end result of the Commission's action was clearly
demonstrated to be "unjust and unreasonable" by the com-
plaining parties, they had failed to make a case for chang-
ing the Commission's conclusions. In a brief introductory
paragraph, the Court assumed that it had already been
established that there was no doubt as to the constitutional
validity of Commission set rates which might impair the
value of property regulated. The Court said in part:
"When we sustained the constitutionality of the
Natural Gas Act in the Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case,
we stated that the 'authority of Congress to regulate
the prices of commodities in interstate commerce is at
least as great under the Fifth Amendment as is that
of the states under the Fourteenth to regulate the
prices of commodities in intrastate commerce.' . ..
Rate-making is indeed but one species of price-fixing.
... The fixing of prices, like other applications of
the police power, may reduce the value of the property
819 U. S. 735 (1943).
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which is being regulated. But the fact that the value
is reduced does not mean that the regulation is invalid.
* . . It does, however, indicate that 'fair value' is the
end product of the process of rate-making not the
starting point as the Circuit Court of Appeals held.
The heart of the matter is that rates cannot be made
to depend upon 'fair value' when the value of the going
enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates
may be anticipated.
"We held in Federal Power Commission v. Natural
Gas Pipeline Co., supra, that the Commission was not
bound to the use of any single formula or combination
of formulae in determining rates. Its rate-making
function, moreover, involves the making of 'pragmatic
adjustments.' . . . And when the Commission's order
is challenged in the courts, the question is whether
that order 'viewed in its entirety' meets the require-
ments of the Act.... Under the statutory standard
of 'just and reasonable' it is the result reached not
the method employed which is controlling .... It is
not theory but the impact of the rate order which
counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be
said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial injuiry
under the Act is at an end. The fact that the method
employed to reach that result may contain infirmities
is not then important. Moreover, the Commission's
order does not become suspect by reason of the fact
that it is challenged. It is the product of expert judg-
ment which carries a presumption of validity. And he
who would upset the rate order under the Act carries
the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that
it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in
its consequences."
The Court then proceeded to emphasize: (1) that the
Hope Company was a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Standard Oil Company (N. J.) with no securities outstand-
ing except $28,000,000 of capital stock; (2) that over the
four decades of its operations it had earned the total in-
vestment in the Company nearly seven times; (3) that the
Company's regular dividends had been high and its accu-
mulated depreciation reserves and earned surplus accounts
were large. After thus surveying the facts, and reviewing
some of the Federal Power Commission's conclusions from
them, the Court concluded:
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"In view of these various considerations we cannot
say that an annual return of $2,191,314 is not 'just and
reasonable' within the meaning of the Act. Rates
which enable the company to operate successfully, to
maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and
to compensate its investors for the risks assumed cer-
tainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even though
they might produce only a meager return on the so-
called 'fair value' rate base. .. "
After thus disposing of the valuation problem, the ma-
jority opinion briefly approved the Commission's approach
to the calculation of annual depreciation on cost and ex-
pressly disapproved the United Railways decision to the
contrary, accepting by footnote reference Mr. Justice
Brandeis' dissenting opinion in the United Railways case
for "an extended analysis of the problem. '4
The opinion then devoted several pages to the rights of
West Virginia as an intervener in the litigation and con-
cluded that the Federal Power Commission was correct
in not allowing the effect on the taxing problem of that
State to control its result in this rate regulation of the
interstate sale of gas produced in West Virginia. This
section of the opinion, while of interest in relation to the
problem of Federal and State cooperation as visualized by
the various acts conferring authority on the Federal Power
Commission,5 is not within the scope of this comment.
The major impact of the case, of course, has been in
its popular interpretation as striking the death knell of
Smyth v. Ames6 and the constitutional protection to prop-
' United Railways & Electric Co. v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 259-288 (1930).
This problem of the appropriate base for the calculation of annual depre-
ciation is important enough to call for extended comment on its merits.
However, that is beyond the scope of the present note. State law on the
subject would seem to fall under the general comments which follow with
reference to the rate base.
5 See: BAUM, THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND STATE UTILITY
REGULATION (1942).
6 169 U. S. 466 (1898). The fair value rule Is too well known to call
for independent discussion here. For its development see: Wilcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 41 (1909); Minnesota Rate Cases
(Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 454 (1913); Denver v. Denver
Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 178, 191 (1918) ; Newton v. Consolidated Gas
Co., 258 U. S. 651 (1920); Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U. S.
388 (1922) ; Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. P. S. C., 262 U. S.
276 (1923). The last case contains a concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis (concurred in by Mr. Justice Holmes) setting forth the "pru-
dent investment" theory which became the basis for most of the modern
attacks on the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames. A good history of the cases
up to the time of its publication may be found In BAuER AND GOLD,
PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION FOR PURPOSES OF RATE CONTROL (1934). Con-
1944]
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erty as embodied in the "fair value" rule of that decision.
Actually, as said earlier, the opinion assumes that there
is no such constitutional protection as "rates must yield
a fair return upon the present fair value of property."
There is no mention of Smyth v. Ames or the long line of
subsequent cases resting on the above statement of its rule.
There is no express over-ruling of its doctrine. However,
in so far as the opinion in its entirety is predicated on the
assumption of need for compliance only with the statutory
standard, and in so far as the facts of the case indicate
that the Federal Power Commission made no attempt to
allow a return based on value, and in so far as the result
of the Supreme Court action and several brief statements
of the opinion accept the fact that the Constitution offers
no such protection, the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames as far
as Federal constitutional interpretation is concerned would
seem to be as dead as if expressly overruled.
This becomes the more true if it is observed that none
of the concurring or dissenting opinions rests on the as-
sumption of any continuing constitutional protection of
"fair return upon present fair value of property" in rate
making. The dissent of Mr. Justice Reed, which comes
closest to this, rests upon the assumption that the statute
under which the Commission acted authorized "just and
reasonable rates" as currently interpreted in the cases at
the time of passage of the statute, which called for a Com-
mission's appraisal of fair value as the rate base. Mr.
Justice Reed was satisfied that the Commission had stayed
within its powers as to the property valued, but felt that
the Commission had acted unreasonably in excluding the
$17,000,000 of development expenditures.
The dissents of Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
Jackson likewise rested on statutory construction. They
emphasized, however, that the statutory standard had to
be specially interpreted with reference to the particular
industry regulated and they felt that there had not been
sufficient consideration of the particular problems attend-
ant upon the development and exploitation of natural gas
fields for the Commission's action to be allowed to stand.
Mr. Justice Jackson was the more explicit as to the nature
of the things he desired to have considered. Mr. Justice
cerning the more recent developments, see: Goddard, The Evolution and
Devolution of Public Utility Law (1934) 32 Mich. L. Rev. 577; Hale, The
"Fair Value" Merry-Go-Round, 1898-1988 (1939) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 517;
Hale, Commissions, Rates, and Policies (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1103;
Hale, Doe8 the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still Walkf (1942) 55 Harv. L.
Rev. 1116.
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Frankfurter adopted Mr. Justice Jackson's views, but
emphasized that Congress under the statute involved, had
left review of the Commission's determination to the
Courts, and for this to be carried out properly the Com-
mission was required to be more explicit as to the criteria
that guided its ultimate determination along the lines of
the reasonableness of the rates in the particular field
regulated.
The brief concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Murphy went largely to criticize Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dictum assumption that the silence of Con-
gress over the years had indicated "Congressional acquies-
cence to date in the doctrine of Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
Minnesota,"7 and to indicate their disagreement with his
assumption.
Thus, it might be said that all the judges participating
were willing to acquiesce in the abandonment of the consti-
tutional guarantee that rates to be reasonable must yield
a fair return upon the present fair value of property reg-
ulated.8  The conclusion might be even more broadly put
that the Court indicates that it will not exercise any more
supervision over rate-regulation than over any other eco-
nomic regulations of Congress, or of the States. To acute
observers, this was the only practical end the Court could
reach, once it had established the validity of price regula-
tion outside the category of utility regulation. That is,
when in Nebbia v. New York,9 and later even more broadly
7 134 U. S. 418 (1890). The doctrine of this case to which Mr. Justice
Frankfurter referred was that the Courts must exercise the final say as
to the reasonableness of rates set by legislative action. Or, as put more
broadly by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Murphy, "That was the
case in which a majority of this Court was finally induced to expand
the meaning of 'due process' so as to give courts power to block efforts
of state and national governments to regulate economic affairs." Cf.
Olsen v. Nebraska, infra, n. 9.
8This is confirmed in the majority opinion of Bowles v. Willingham,
64 S. Ct. 641 (U. S., 1944) (Mr. Justice Roberts alone dissenting) where
Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for the majority in upholding rent regula-
tion under the Emergency Price Control Act, said: "Of course, price
control, the same as other forms of regulation, may reduce the value of
the property regulated. But, as we have pointed out in the Hope
Natural Gas Co. case • . . that does not mean that the regulation is
unconstitutional." However, the same opinion later continued: "We
need not determine what constitutional limits there are to price-fixing
legislation. Congress was dealing here with conditions created by activi-
ties resulting from a great war effort. . . . A. nation which can de-
mand the lives of its men and women in the waging of that war is
under no constitutional necessity of providing a system of price control
on the domestic front which will assure each landlord a 'fair return'
on his property." '
'291 U. S. 502, 523-539 (1934).
1944]
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in Olson v. Nebraska,10 the Court indicated that price con-
trol was not limited to special businesses (i. e., as affected
with a public interest" or "dedicated to a public use")
but could be extended by the appropriate legislative au-
thority wherever it would be "reasonable" and not "arbi-
trary or discriminatory," the situation was pregnant with
the possibility of the Court's ultimately facing the appli-
cation of the "fair value" rule to any and every industry
whose prices were controlled. With the guarantee of inde-
pendent judicial review of the fact of value established by
the Ben Avon Borough decision," the task of the courts
could easily have become insurmountable, and effective
price control impossible. Accordingly, the approach of
the Court in the Nebbia and Olson cases contained the
philosophy that spelled the death of Smyth v. Ames (and
with it the doctrine of the Ben Avon Borough case as ap-
plied to price control).
The Court in the Nebbia case said:
"If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due
process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that
effect renders a court functus officio."
In Olsen v. Nebraska, the Court said:
"We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom,
need, or appropriateness of the legislation. Differences
of opinion on that score suggest a choice which 'should
be left where . . . it was left by the Constitution-
to the States and to Congress.' . . . There is no neces-
sity for the state to demonstrate before us that evils
persist despite the competition which attends the bar-
gaining in this field. In final analysis, the only consti-
tutional prohibitions or restraints which respondents
have suggested for the invalidation of this legislation
are those notions of public policy embedded in earlier
decisions of this Court but which, as Mr. Justice
Holmes long admonished, should not be read into the
Constitution .... Since they do not find expression
in the Constitution, we cannot give them continuing
10313 U. S. 236 (1941).
1- 253 U. S. 287 (1920). Of course, the doctrine of the case was con-
siderably curtailed by St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S.
38 (1935). See: Larson, The Doctrine of Comstitutional Fact (1941)
15 Temp. L. Quart. 285.
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vitality as standards by which the constitutionality of
the economic and social programs of the states is to
be determined."
Thus if Congress, or a State legislature, sets a rate the
Court would not lightly substitute its judgment as to the
validity of such rate. If the power to set the rate is dele-
gated to a Commission, the Court similarly would be slow
to alter the Commission action except for failure to con-
form to the legislative standard. Thus, unless a statute
embodied as a standard the rule of Smyth v. Ames (Mr.
Justice Reed seemed to feel that the Natural Gas Act did),
the Court would not accept that rule as the sole test of
reasonableness.
However, prediction of the Court's result in the Hope
case did not need to rest on such broad deductions from
the Court's general constitutional philosophy. In a series
of preceding rate, or valuation, opinions, the evidence was
clearly present that the "fair return upon present fair
value" formula of Smyth v. Ames (as understood at least
in the early twentieth century) was to be foundered by
the broader constitutional and administrative law doctrines
of the present Court.12 The Hope case made explicit what
was already implicit in prior decisions, namely that the
Supreme Court had relaxed the Constitutional guarantee
of the rule of Smyth v. Ames and that the Federal Power
Commission would not be forced to construe the Natural
Gas Act as embodying that rule.
It is a little surprising, therefore, that the Hope case
caused such a wide popular furor and so easily created
an impression that all utility regulation was immediately
changed thereby. This interpretation of the case com-
pletely overlooks the nature of utility regulation.
The State Commissions, like all other administrative
bodies, are dependent upon the authority given by the
Statutes under which they were created and continue to
act."3 They are bodies of delegated power, obliged to stay
12 Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 289 U. S.
287, 304, 305 (1933); West Ohio Gas Co. v. P. U. C., 294 U. S. 63, 70
(1935); Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. P. S. C., 291 U. S. 227 (1934); West
v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662, 692, 693 (dissenting opinion); Fed-
eral Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575,
586 (1942).
18 Language of the Maryland Court of Appeals in P. S. C. v. Sun Cab
Co., 160 Md. 476, 479, 154 A. 100 (1931) is typical:
" ..The powers of the commission are such as are conferred
by the Act of 1910, ch. 180, and amendments, known as the Public
Service Commission Law, and all its acts are legislative; but, unlike
the Legislature, it is limited strictly to the powers so delegated.
19441
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within their delegated functions. The Hope case indicates
that the Natural Gas Act did not embody the rule of Smyth
v. Ames as a restriction on the rate-making powers of the
Federal Power Commission. But, in a majority of juris-
dictions, the State Commissions are acting under statutes
which expressly, or by interpretation, have embodied thefair return upon fair value rule of Smyth v. Ames. And,
in such jurisdictions, there would seem to be no justifica-
tion for accepting the Hope case as changing Commission
powers to act.
That this is true has already been recognized in two
states. In People's Natural Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission,4 the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in
anticipation of the Hope decision, said:
"And it is important to bear in mind that, even
though the Supreme Court of the United States as
presently constituted, may, in the near future, over-
rule some of its former decisions and uphold as con-
stitutional something other than fair value as a rate
base, such change of position would not effect a change
in the law of this commonwealth. Since the legislature
put fair value into our law, together with what in 1937,
when the law was passed, was universally understood
to have been the elements of fair value, that body alone
can take it out and substitute something else in its
place. If and when the change comes-the concurring
justices in Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. .. . suggest that it has already taken
place-it will simply mean that a constitutional limit
on the power of the legislature to experiment or in-
novate will have been removed."
In Northern States Power Company v. Public Service
Commission, 5 decided since the Hope case, the highest
court of North Dakota expressed a similar view:
"In the former appeal in this case (Northern States
Power Co. v. Board of Railroad Com'rs, 71 N. D. 1, 298
N. W. 423) we held that the fair value formula as set
Gregg v. Public Service Comm., 121 Md. 1, 87 A. 1111. As stated by
Judge Offutt in Public Service Comm. v. Phila., B. & W. R. Co.,
155 Md. 104, 114, 141 A. 509, 514: 'It exercises a naked statutory
authority, and has no power save such as were expressly granted to
it by the Legislature and such implied powers as are necessary to
enable it to exert its express powers.' . . ."1434 A. (2d) 375, 382 (Pa. Super. Ct., 1943).
1513 N. W. (2d) 779, 785 (N. D., 1944).
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forth in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418,
42 L. Ed. 819, and as modified by subsequent decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States had been
adopted by the Legislature of this State in 1919 as
the formula for determining rate bases for public
utilities. There can be no doubt today, but that, inso-
far as the federal courts are concerned, the 'ghost of
Smyth v. Ames had been laid.' . .. That circum-
stance, however, has no bearing upon the question
before us now. We are concerned with the law of this
State as enacted in 1919. In the decision in the former
appeal in this case we gave extended consideration to
the construction of this statute and we see no reason
now to modify that construction."
It is reasonably to be expected that most courts and
commissions would feel legally bound to the approach indi-
cated in these opinions. Only states such as California and
Massachusetts, whose commissions for years have been
interpreting their empowering statutes as supporting re-
turns based on "prudent investment" cost, derive immed-
iate "go" signals from the Hope case. Other State Com-
missions will continue to operate within the limits of em-
powering statutes embodying the "fair value" rule and
some may even find constitutional restrictions. The Mary-
land Court of Appeals has indicated that such a restriction
exists in Maryland.16 Obviously the meaning of state stat-
utes and state constitutions is entirely within the control
of the state courts.17
However, without need for considering constitutional
limitations, the Public Service Commission Law of Mary-
10 See P. S. C. v. United Rys., infra, circa n. 24. See also United Rys. v.
P. S. C., 157 Md. 70, 71, 145 A. 340 (1929).
17 Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. 291 (1832) ; Leffingwell v. Warren, 67 U. S. 599
(1862) ; Merchant and Manufacturers National Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167
U. S. 461 (1897); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78, 79 (1938);
Moore v. Ill. Central, 312 U. S. 630, 634 (1941) ; 1 WILLOUia~ny, CoasTiTu-
TIONAL LAW (1929) 37. In Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, Mr. Justice Brandeis,
speaking for the Court, said in part:
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its
Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern .... "
"... Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action
of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the
Constitution specially authorized or delegated to the United States.
Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an in-
vasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of
its independence."
1944]
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land in its valuation section seems to have incorporated
the fair value rule of Smyth v. Ames and the Commission
would seem to be bound to follow that rule. The statute
reads: 8
"396. The commission shall, whenever it may
deem it desirable to do so, investigate and ascertain
the fair value of property of any corporation subject
to the provisions of this sub-title and used by it for the
convenience of the public. For the purpose of such
investigation the commission is authorized to employ
such engineers, experts and other assistants as may
be necessary. Such investigations shall be prosecuted
with diligence and thoroughness, and the results there-
of reported to the legislature at each regular session.
Such valuation shall show the value of the property of
every such corporation as a whole, and the value of its
property in each of the several counties and munici-
palities within the State of Maryland ......
While this language might leave some room for specu-
lation as to the meaning of value, the history of the act,
the interpretations of the Public Service Commission in
prior rate proceedings, and the rulings of the Court of
Appeals in the rate cases that have been before it, leave
no doubt but what the fair value rule for rate making is
statutory law of Maryland.
The Public Service Commission Law was enacted in
1910 just after the Supreme Court of the United States had
decided the case of Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Company
of New York,19 relating to gas rates in New York City.
The case, following earlier decisions, specifically held that
if utility property had increased in value (from the time
of its original purchase) the company was entitled to earn
a return on such increased value. Mr. Justice Peckham,
speaking for a unanimous Court, said:
"There must be a fair return upon the reasonable
value of the property at the time it is being used for
the public. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National
City, 174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154, 1161, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep.
804; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S.
439, 442, 47 L. ed. 892, 894, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 571.
18 Md. Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 396.
19 212 U. S. 19, 41, 52 (1909).
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"And we concur with the court below in holding
that the value of the property is to be determined as
of the time when the inquiry is made regarding the
rates. If the property which legally enters into the
consideration of the question of rates has increased in
value since it was acquired, the company is entitled
to the benefit of such increase ... "
There can be little doubt that the Legislature was
aware of such pronouncements as to the meaning of
"value" when it adopted a Public Service Commission Law
worded in terms of "value." 0  But, be that as it may, the
Court of Appeals has left no doubt as to its opinion in the
matter. In Miles v. Public Service Commission,21 the Court
specifically took cognizance of the fact that the valuation
provision of the Maryland law was enacted in order to em-
body into State law the principles previously enunciated
by the United States Supreme Court. The Court of Ap-
peals said:
".... as was said by the Supreme Court in San
Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739:
'What the company is entitled to demand in order
that it may have just compensation is a fair return
upon the reasonable value of the property at the time
it is being used for the public.' It is such a valuation
which section 385 of article 23 of the Code of 1924
authorizes the Public Service Commission to make;
the language being: 'The commission shall, whenever
it may deem it desirable to do so, investigate and as-
certain the fair value of property of any corporation
subject to the provisions of this sub-title and used
by it for the convenience of the public .... Such
valuation shall show the value of the property of
every such corporation as a whole and the value of its
property in each of the several counties and munici-
palities within the State of Maryland.'
"The very purpose of authorizing the commission
to ascertain the value of the property of the various
"
0 The Maryland Act was largely in terms of the New York Law and
New York litigation had just been completed in the United States Supreme
Court. Also, the bill as proposed to the legislature contained a reference
to "Wilcox v. Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19" in explanation of the valuation sec-
tion. See a draft of the proposed bill as submitted by Attorney General
Isaac Lobe Straus under title "A Public Utilities Bill... for the considera-
tion of Governor Crothers and Cabinet" (1909) 59.
21151 Md. 337, 344, 135 A. 579, 49 A. L. R. 1470 (1926).
1944]
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public service corporations is to enable it to fix the
rates which the corporation is permitted to charge the
public for the service rendered ... " (Emphasis
added.)
Actually, the Court of Appeals had earlier indicated
that reasonable rates meant rates calculated to yield a fair
return upon the present value of the property of the regu-
lated utility, in the first case presented to it calling for con-
sideration of the valuation problem under the Public Serv-
ice Commission Law. In Havre de Grace Bridge Co. v.
Public Service Commission, the litigation involved an
order of the Public Service Commission issued to the Havre
de Grace Bridge Company to reduce its rates of toll on a
bridge over the Susquehanna River between Havre de
Grace and Perryville. The bridge had been officially built
as a railroad bridge some 40 years earlier at a cost of over
$2,000,000. The bridge had become inadequate as a rail-
road bridge and the railroad had built a new bridge with
the assent of the Legislature, subject to a requirement that
the old bridge be removed. The railroad converted the old
bridge into a highway bridge at a cost of some $89,000
(probably to avoid a greater expense of destruction) and
turned the bridge over to the Havre de Grace Company,
formed for the purpose of operating the bridge with a
capitalization of $50,000. The Bridge Company spent
$1,700 in erecting tool houses, etc., and began operating
the bridge, which yielded only a meagre income as had
been expected. However, with the development of the
automobile, the annual revenues suddenly increased to
where they were in excess of the original capitalization of
the Company. The litigation grew out of protests by resi-
dents of adjoining counties that tolls were too high and the
consequent Public Service Commission, order to reduce
them (by 40% according to the P. S. C., 72% according to
the Company). This order the Bridge Company unsuc-
cessfully attacked in Circuit Court No. 2 for Baltimore
City. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed the facts,
the procedure of the Commission, and of the lower Court in
considering the propriety of the Commission's action in
determining value. It then set forth the Court's ideas of
what the Public Service Commission Law allowed the
Commission to do, and reversed and remanded the case
2 132 Md. 16, 103 A. 319 (1918).
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to the end that the order be set aside and the case be re-
manded to the Commission. The Court said in part:
"Both in the argument and in the brief filed on be-
half of the Public Service Commission there was used,
probably by inadvertence, an expression calculated to
mislead, namely, the value of the property of the
bridge company for rate making purposes. The provi-
sion for the valuation of the property of a corporation,
subject to the Public Service Law, is found in the Code
in Article 23, section 442 (now Sec. 396, supra), where
the Commission is empowered to 'ascertain the fair
value of the property of any corporation subject to
the provisions of this sub-title.' That, and that only,
is the valuation which the Public Service Commission
is authorized to ascertain, and it would tend not only
to work an injustice, but to render absurd a proposi-
tion that the property of a public service corporation
might have one value in fact, another for purposes of
rate making, and a third for purposes of taxation,"3
in the absence of statutory provision such as obtains
in some states, that for taxation purposes property is
to be assessed at only a given percentage of its real
value. What the Commission in this case was author-
ized to ascertain under the section referred to was
the fair value of the property.
the company owes a duty to the public as
well as to its stockholders, and must charge no more
than a reasonable rate for the services rendered.
"In reaching this, there are many factors to be con-
sidered. A partial enumeration of these would in-
clude the value of the property employed, the value
of the service rendered to the user, whether or not
the corporation enjoyed a monopoly, the rate of re-
turn which should be made to the stockholders after
the payment of operating expenses, upkeep and fixed
charges, a reasonable allowance for depreciation,
whether or not the utility is in operation or in fieri,
the risk incurred by those who began the under-
taking, and others which may arise out of the utility
which is being operated.
21 See this language explained in Miles v. P. S. C., 151 Md. 337, 344, 345,
135 A. 579, 49 A. L. R. 1470 (1926)
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"In undertaking the work of the valuation of this
bridge the Commission proceeded about as follows: it
had its own regular engineer estimate the cost of the
reproduction of the bridge, and in the course of the
testimony before the Court another engineer, lfr.
Shirley, was called upon the same point. The Com-
mission had determined naturally and properly to re-
ject the valuation of the bridge simply upon the basis
of what it had cost the incorporators. This would
have been as far afield as it would have been to have
taken the cost of the bridge to the P., W. & B. R. R.
at the time of the original construction. The real
point to be ascertained was not what it had cost either
the railroad company to build the bridge, or the in-
corporators of the Bridge Company to acquire it, but
what was its fair value at the time of the investiga-
tion by the Commission. In a number of cases re-
course has been had to this line of inquiry for a sim-
ilar purpose, but the value testified to of such a
structure is only one of the factors to which considera-
tion must needs be given in such a proceeding, and the
reproduction value is liable to be increased from other
considerations, and diminished by various allowances."
(Emphasis added.)
In this first interpretation of the Maryland Public Serv-
ice Commission Act, the Court predicated its result entirely
on its construction of the Statute. No sentence, word, or
phrase referred to any constitutional compulsion for its
result. No decision of the United States Supreme Court
was mentioned or referred to in the opinion as influencing
the Court's approach. It is improbable that the meaning
of a statute, so construed, .would be affected by the Hope
case's departure from earlier federal doctrine.
The approach of the Havre de Grace case was confirmed
by the Court of Appeals in Miles v. P. S. C., supra, and in
P. S. C. v. United Rwys. Co.24 In the latter case, the deci-
sion went largely to the reasonableness of the rate of
return allowed. However, in a brief reference to valua-
tion, the Court said:
"The central dominating question presented by the
appeal is whether the schedule of rates promulgated
by the commission is sufficient to yield such an income
"' 155 Md. 572, 579, 142 A. 870 (1928).
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as will give to the company a fair return on the value
of its property .... So that the question actually
is whether a schedule of fares which, after deducting
all reasonable and proper expenses for the manage-
ment and operation of the company, permits it to earn
a net return of 6.26 per cent. on the value of its prop-
erty, is confiscatory within the meaning of the state
and federal constitutions, or unlawful and unreason-
able within the meaning of the statute creating the
commission. To that question there are various ap-
proaches, all differing in some degree in the effect they
have upon the meaning and weight of the facts of the
case.
"In valuing the property for rate making purposes,
the commission based its conclusion upon its present
value and not upon its original cost, and in fact the
case of Havre de Grace Bridge Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm., supra, left it no alternative ... " (Em-
phasis added.)
A survey of the Public Service Commission reports con-
firms that the Commission, from the first opinion rendered
to it by its first general counsel,25 through its latest rate
proceedings, has followed the legislative mandate of rea-
sonable return based upon present fair value.
26
The failure of the Legislature to change the statute dur-
ing more than thirty years of such consistent interpretation
of its meaning is to give practically conclusive effect to
such interpretation.27 This doctrine of ratification by ac-
quiescence is supplemented in Maryland by the fact that,
in 1941 in passing a statute giving the Public Service Com-
mission authority to establish temporary rates, the Legis-
lature worded the law in terms of "reasonable return
25 Opinion by Senator William Cabell Bruce, 2 Md. P. S. C. Reports 494
(1911).
25 See 4 Md. P. S. C. Reports 39 (1913); 8 Md. P. S. C. Reports 198
(1917); 14 Md. P. S. C. Reports 100, 104 (1923) ; 16 Md. P. S. C. Reports 74
(1926); 24 Md. P. S. C. Reports 288 (1933); 31 Md. P. S. C. 87, 95
(1940); which is the last formal opinion of the Md. Commission in a
rate case, and which clearly states, "The Company is entitled to a reason-
able return on the fair value 'of its property" and gives full weight to
reproduction cost.
27 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Machen, 132 Md. 618, 623, 104
A. 175 (1918); Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. State, 146 Md. 192, 198,
126 A. 127 (1924) ; Arnreich v. State, 150 Md. 91, 103, 132 A. 430 (1926) ;
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, 369 (1940); Note
(1942) 7 Md. L. Rev. 87.
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upon the value" of the property.28  Such use of lan-
guage with well accepted construction by the Courts and
by the Commission would normally be treated as adoption
of the current usage of the terms.2 9
With this consistent interpretation of the meaning of
the Maryland Public Service Commission Law by the
Court of Appeals and by the Commission, as calling for a
return based on value, and practically a ratification of this
by the Legislature in 1941, it would seem that the decision
of the Hope Natural Gas case would have little immediate
effect in Maryland. Like the courts of Pennsylvania and
North Dakota, the courts of Maryland would be obliged
to apply their own statute in ruling upon Public Service
Commission authority to establish rates for Maryland utili-
ties. If the Public Service Commission adheres to the es-
tablished construction of the statute from which it derives
its authority, the Courts will not even be called upon to
face the issue.
Accordingly, other than to make the public rate con-
scious, and thus to stimulate Commission inquiry into the
fairness of existing rates under traditional standards, the
Hope case should not have any great immediate effect in
Maryland, or in states with similar utility laws. Investiga-
tions, hastily stimulated, may or may not result in major
rate changes in favor of the public. For, in a period of in-
flated values and increased costs of operation, such as now
exists, any investigation made along the lines of fair return
upon present fair value may as readily point toward a rate
increase as to a rate decrease.
Aside from all else, the abnormal conditions accom-
panying a war economy are not appropriate for rate in-
vestigations. 0 Many State Commissions have suggested an
aversion to wartime investigations in connection with the
instant war, or after investigation have refrained from
action.3 ' This feeling was perhaps most cogently put by
98 Md. Code Supp. (1943) Art. 23, Sec. 272.
McKee v. McKee, 17 Md. 352, 359 (1861) ; Balto. & Phila. Steamboat
Co. v. State Tax Comm., 157 Md. 279, 283, 145 A. 770 (1929).
80 This has been deemed to be true of any period of abnormal price
change, West v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662, 673 (1935). And see cases
infra, n. 31.
31 Re: Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 34 P. U. R. (N. S.) 1 (N. J.,
1940); Re: Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 36 P. U. R. (N. S.) 1 (MinL,
1940); Re: Customers of Plymouth County Electric Co., 39 P. U. R. (N. S.)
20 (Mass., 1941) ; Re: Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 40 P. U. R. (N. S.)
327 (Mont., 1941) ; Re: Kentucky Utilities Company, 41 P. U. R. (N. S.)
129 (Ky., 1942); Mayor of Lynn v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 42
P. U. R. (N. S.) 1 (Mass., 1942). See also the introduction to the annual
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the Massachusetts Commission when it expressed itself
with reference to an investigation of the rates and charges
of the New England Telephone and Telegraph Company,
after a public hearing at the petition of the town of Lynn
with reference to exorbitant rates alleged to be charged its
citizens. The Commission said: 32
"Apart from what we believe to be a fact that a
statewide rate investigation would result in no tangi-
ble benefits in these times, we are conscientiously alert
to the dangers which could result from such an un-
timely investigation.
"Prior to the declarations of war, and since, the
company has expended huge sums of moneys in a co-
operational effort to make intelligently effective the
plans of the United States government directed toward
a successful and efficient conclusion of the war. The
defense program and now the war effort require many
additional facilities. The energies and resources of
the company are being used. Many of the company's
officials and employees whose services would be
needed immediately by the company, if a rate investi-
gation were to begin, are engaged now in the solution
of problems arising out of war activities and at present
they are devoting practically all of their time and
effort in that direction.
"On December 29, 1941, His Excellency, Governor
Leverett Saltonstall, issued a proclamation which set
forth and proclaimed 'that a state of emergency exists
by reason of war whereby the peace and security of
the commonwealth are endangered by the imminent
reports of the New York Commission 1940 and 1942; and also, statement
of policy "In re: Earnings During War Emergency" issued June 9, 1943
by the Pennsylvania Commission quoted infra, n. 33. Cf. Annual Report of
the Tennessee Valley Authority (1943) p. 46, saying:
"However, the war has intervened and forestalled any general
trend toward rate reductions which a number of systems are finan-
cially able to make. There are several reasons for holding such
reductions in abeyance. Rate reductions would tend to encourage
increased use and would therefore conflict with programs for the
conservation of fuel, transportation, manpower, and critical mate-
rials. From the standpoint of furthering the wider use of elec-
tricity, it is felt that rate reductions should be delayed until they
can be accompanied by sustained and effective promotional activity
in the appliance field. Delay also will permit a more complete
appraisal of the probable post-war earnings of the distributors."
"
2 Lynn v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 42 P. U. R. (N. S.) 1 (Mass.
D. P. U., 1942).
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threat of belligerent acts of the enemies of the United
States' and it was thereupon urged by the governor
that:
"'In addition, I urge all the people of the common-
wealth to cooperate with and assist the duly consti-
tuted authorities in all measures taken for defense, and
to avail themselves at every opportunity of the privi-
lege of serving in some capacity in the common en-
deavor which will bring us victory over all our en-
emies.'
"In our nation's present crisis, the company is com-
mendably and capably serving in a 'capacity in the
common endeavor.' Moreover, the resources of the
company are needed by the nation. It would not be in
the public interest for us to intervene at this time."
On June 7, 1943, the Pennsylvania Commission in a
statement of policy issued to all public utilities subject to
its jurisdiction clearly indicated that it deemed it inadvis-
able to conduct any general rate investigation during the
war and that it would do so only if utilities refused to co-
operate in the conservation of wartime earnings. The Com-
mission formally declared its policy to be:
"(a) That it is imperative that public utilities
maintain a strong financial position throughout the
war emergency, to the end that they may render
prompt and uninterrupted service during said emer-
gency and that they may enter the post-war period
prepared to promptly take up the matter of deferred
maintenance and the rehabilitation of their properties.
"(b) That the Commission deems it inadvisable to
institute formal investigations into the reasonableness
of existing rates which appear to be producing in-
creased earnings as the result of an artificial economic
situation created by war conditions.
"(c) That the Commission invites the cooperation
of all public utilities in refraining from the payment
of dividends or owners' salaries materially higher than
similar payments in peace-time to the end that cash
may be conserved to adequately meet post-war condi-
tions; but that without such cooperation the only al-
ternative left to the Commission is to institute an in-
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vestigation into the. rates, depreciation and mainte-
nance practices and other related affairs of any public
utility showing abnormal earnings. '83
Thus, because of the time at which it was decided, plus
its inherent nature, the Hope case is not likely to have
the widespread immediate effect on utility regulation as
was generally indicated by popular commentaries. As in
Maryland, because of the wording of the Public Service
Commission Law and its interpretation by the State
Courts, many of the state utility commissions are given
no authority to make wholesale revaluations of property
because of the Hope decision. Investigations are called for
"The Commission, after observing the increased earnings and before
making its declaration of policy, said:
"Whether or not this increase in earnings has resulted in an un-
reasonable return to any particular utility is determinable only
after full consideration of that utility's affairs. The Commission
takes cognizance of the fact that the increased demands of the
war and the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Govern-
ment to expedite the war program, has produced an artificial eco-
nomic situation, which renders difficult an adjudication of rates
which would be fair and reasonable both in the present war
emergency and the ensuing post-war period, giving due considera-
tion to the interests of consumers, the investors, the tax author-
ities and the utilities.
The Commission takes cognizance of the increased speed and
continuous use of equipment now required to meet demands for
service; the departure from maintenance routine occasioned by
such continuous use, as well as by the scarcity of maintenance
personnel and materials; and, in some instances, the installation
of equipment of a character or capacity which is suitable for war-
time needs, but which may not be used or useful in the public service
when peacetime operation is resumed.
The Commission expects the public utilities under its jurisdiction
to offset these wartime costs against the wartime revenues they are
producing, to the end that depreciation now being suffered, and
maintenance now being deferred, shall not be offered as arguments
In support of post-war rate increases, or to prevent, when otherwise
warranted, post-war rate reductions. The Commission now advises
the public utilities subject to Its jurisdiction that It will scrutinize
every such argument in the light of the equipment operating records,
the charges to depreciation and maintenance, and the operating in-
come, for the period through which we are now passing.
The Commission Is also aware of the fact that many wartime
inventions have peacetime applications, and thereby speed the obso-
lescence of pre-war devices; and that to provide the newest equip-
ment and the most modern service, the public utility industry may
require huge quantities of cash when the war is ended.
All of these factors point to a provident and cautious course In
disposing of abnormal earnings. They indicate that the payment of
abnormally large dividends, or of excessive salaries of partners and
individual owners, may be ultimately injurious, not only to the re-
cipients, but to the public service as well."
The quotations are taken from a mimeographed copy of the "Statement
of Policy-In re: Earnings During War Emergency."
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only to the extent to which existing requirements of state
law have not been met.
The most that can fairly be said is that the Hope case
indicates that, if a state commission in appropriate com-
pliance with state law, reduces utility rates after a fair
hearing and is sustained by the state courts, there is little
reason to anticipate any further judicial protection from
the United States Supreme Court on the ground of confis-
cation. It is doubtful, however, whether state courts and
legislatures, which have shown no tendency to move away
from the fair value rule during the last twenty years, will
change overnight with the decision of the Hope case any
more so than they have changed with other alterations or
reversals of doctrine by the Supreme Court.
VESTED AND CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
Sale Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Bouse'
The testatrix died in 1922 and bequeathed one-fourth
of the residue of her estate in trust for her son, Alfred,
for life, and after his death to his child or children living
at the time of his death, but if he should die without leaving
any surviving children, or if his children should all die
before the age of twenty-one years, then to the other chil-
dren of the testatrix, naming them. A similar bequest
was made to her daughter, Mary Helen. Both bequests
were made upon condition that the life tenants make sim-
ilar provision for the devolution of certain other property;
these conditions were complied with by the life tenants,
both of whom executed deeds of trust containing similar
limitations, shortly after the death of the testatrix. Alfred
died in 1940 without any surviving children;2 Mary Helen
died in 1941 leaving three children surviving.3 After the
death of the testatrix and after the execution of the trusts
by the life tenants, but prior to the death of the life ten-
ants, legislation was passed imposing certain inheritance
taxes which, if applicable, would subject the remainders
to taxation. Held: The remainders passing upon the death
1 181 Md. 351, 29 A. (2d) 906 (1943).
'He was a widower and apparently never had any children. See tran-
script of record, p. 56.
, All of the surviving children were born prior to 1922; two other chil-
dren were born to Mary Helen but had died prior to 1922. Ibid.
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